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would constitute a taking. Id. Many other state courts are <br />In accord with Collis on this point. See, e.g., Simpson v. <br />City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980)i and <br />cases cited in Collis. <br />The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth <br />Circuit, however, recently held that a plaintiff can not <br />maintain a •taking• action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 in federal <br />court without first attempting to utilize state remedies. <br />Collier v. City of Springdale, 733 F.2d 1311, 1314-15, 1317 <br />(8th"Cir. 1984). Collier held that if a governmental entity <br />acquires property by means other than formal condemnation <br />procedures, a plaintiff's recourse is to bring an inverse <br />condemnation action in state court. Id. at 1314. Sere, <br />Plaintiffs in effect argue that defendants are improperly <br />extracting the right of way as a prerequisite to granting the <br />building permit. Clearly, plaintiffs have a state remedy in <br />that they can seek a writ of mandamus in a state trial court. <br />See, e.g., Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 822 <br />(Minn. 1984). <br />The Collier court also noted that <br />fa)lthough the state remedies may not provide <br />. all the relief which may have been <br />available . under g 1983, that does not <br />mean that the state remedies are not adequate <br />to satisfy the requirements of due process. <br />Collier, 733 F.2d at 1317, quotinq Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544. <br />- 6 - <br />