10-15-1984 Council Packet - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

opinion. As such, Martin can hardly be viewed as sound precedent in the case at bar. This Court also cited Boland v. City of Rapid City, 315 N.W.2d 496 (S.D. 1962), in denying Mr. olelsh's claim for attorney's fees. Boland is unsound precedent in the instant case, as the reasons for which the Boland plaintiffs were denied their attorneys' fees are entirely absent here: Counsel are not private attorney generals (sic], but act as private counsel seeking substantial monetary damages for their clients' injuries, from which they [plaintiffs' counsel] will be compensated. Boland, 315 N.14.2d at 503 (emphasis added). Moreover, the court in Boland stressed that the plaintiffs did not seek injunctive relief. Id. Mr. Welsh, on the other hand, sought and secured injunctive and declp,atory relief, and made no claim for money damages. Although this Court made no reference to the nature of the relief sought by Mi. Welsh in ruling on his claim for fees, that factor should be carefully weighed in cases such as this. The Second Circuit has specifically looked to the type of relief sought by a plaintiff in decidi.ig whether an awar2 of attorney's fees is appropriate. in analyzing its decision in Zarcone, the Second Circuit noted: Although we referred to the "public" benefits of the suit as a factor in favor of fees, we explicitly declined to foreclose awards where an individual _ successfuiIy sues for equitable relief. Thus, while Zarcone was principally redressing an "essentially private injury," the controllingreason for denying fees was that the denial of an award did not "present a -7-