Laserfiche WebLink
city) are then provided to the menber cities of the candidate's <br />choice by Defendant MPRS. This court concluded chat the first of <br />these steps was discriminator^'. This court did not find or <br />conclude, however, that the member cities, collectively or <br />indiv’idually, engaged in discrim.inator>’ conduct during the second <br />step of the process — hiring from the list of "eligible* officers. <br />An order approving an acnended test and scoring process would <br />directly address the practice found by the Court to be <br />discriminatory, i.e. the MFRS teacing process. An order compelling <br />hiring quotas would relate to the second step of the hiring process <br />which was not alleged or found to be discriminatory; therefore such <br />an order would not “directly address and relate to the . . <br />violation itself." If the first step is removed as a hurdle, there <br />is no reason to believe that cities would discriminate in selecting <br />from the applicant pool. <br />The need for significant justification for a race-based <br />classification and the limited circumstances under which one may be <br />used are the cornerstone elements of judicial review of any race- <br />based classification. It is, therefore, not surprising that a <br />race-based classification will not pass "strict scrutiny" <br />constitutional muster unless it is: (1) narrowly tailored to(2) <br />achieve a ccm.pelling governm^ent interest.* The Supreme Court has <br />held that there is a compelling government interest in remiedying <br />‘Adarand, 115 S.Ct. 205t il?95). <br />29