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language in the 1948 Deed abundantly satisfies this, reserving an easement"in the grantors <br /> herein, their assigns, the survivor of said parties, and the heirs and assigns of the survivor." This <br /> is the same language that the 1948 Deed uses to transfer ownership of the property to the <br /> grantees in fee simple. <br /> The valid easement created by the 1948 Deed was `reserved' in the grantors and their <br /> `heirs and assigns.' By the legally binding interpretation of the plain language of the 1948 Deed, <br /> the easement created was appurtenant to Lots 22-33, and that portion of Lot 21 not deeded to the <br /> grantee. Therefore the 1948 Deed created an appurtenant easement, burdening Lot 20, for the <br /> benefit of Lots 21-33, as a matter of law. <br /> 2. The circumstances surrounding the 1948 Deed. <br /> The Minnesota Supreme Court has long held that an easement"is never construed to be <br /> in gross-that is, personal-when it can fairly be construed to be appurtenant to the land." Callen, at <br /> 974. The binding rule is "[i]n the partition of land,with a permission for a way over one tract for <br /> the use of the owner of another, the right would be taken and presumed to be appurtenant."Id. <br /> The 1948 Deed was granted in the partition of land. The grantors otherwise land-locked <br /> the remainder of their property on the peninsula. A valid driveway easement was reserved in the <br /> Deed. The purpose of the easement is stated explicitly in the Deed: "for driveway purposes." <br /> This easement can be fairly construed to be appurtenant to the grantors' estate. The easement <br /> provides the only way over Lot 20 for the grantors who owned Lots 21-33. No material issue of <br /> fact exists, and the easement created in the 1948 Deed is an appurtenant easement as a matter of <br /> law. <br /> d. Plaintiffs' request for time for continued discovery. <br /> 1. Plaintiffs' notice of the easement. <br /> 11 <br />