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__ , <br /> _ __ _ , I <br /> See Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 26, 202 N.W.2d 892, 894 (1972) ("It is <br /> fundamental that a municipality's power to regulate land use by zoning exists by virtue of <br /> • authority delegated to it by the state."}. But Minn. Stat. § 462.357, subd. le(b), grants the <br /> City the discretion to permit the expansion of a nonconformity by ordinance. The City ' <br /> provided a mechanism for expa.nsion in section 300.29(g)(1), through a variance <br /> application, and Krummenacher makes no argument that Liebeler's request for a variance <br /> did not satisfy that section of the City Code. <br /> Because the legislature gave the City discretion to authorize the expansion of <br /> Liebeler's nonconforming garage, we hold that the City's decision to allow Liebeler to <br /> seek a variance under the ordinance to expand a nonconformity was consistent with <br /> Minn. Stat. § 462357, subd. le. <br /> II. <br /> We turn next to Krummenacher's argument that the City's decision must be set <br /> aside because it was arbitrary and capricious. Municipalities have "broad discretionary <br /> power" in considering whether to grant or deny a variance. VanLandscl�oot v. City of <br /> Mendota Heig7�ts, 336 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Minn. 1983). We review such decisions "to <br /> determine whether the municipality "was within its jurisdiction, was not mistaken as to <br /> � the applicable law, and did not act arbitrarily, oppressively, or unreasonably; and to <br /> determine whether the evidence could reasonably support or justify the deteimination." <br /> In re Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323, 332 (Minn. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). <br /> 10 <br />