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Thus , building a boat dock without a primary structure on the <br /> property would not be permitted by the code . This construction <br /> explains the denial of respondents ' first dock proposal . At issue <br /> in this appeal is respondents ' shared dock proposal . <br /> The code makes it "unlawful for any person to engage or <br /> participate in business use or joint use without first having <br /> obtained a license therefor from the City. " Id. , § 5 . 42 , subd. 2 . <br /> The code defines "joint use" as "more than two persons joining for <br /> the purpose of using lakeshore property for swimming, bathing, <br /> fishing, docking or mooring boats, or for any other purpose . " Id. , <br /> subd. 1F . In this case, Tillotson and respondents wished to use <br /> the same piece of property for docking boats . In addition, the <br /> code indicates that "private" docks are a permissible accessory <br /> use . The use of the dock by both Tillotson and respondents did not <br /> seemingly transform it into a business use, but the proposal did <br /> not call for a purely private dock for the Tillotson home . The <br /> definition of "use-accessory" provides that it is a use <br /> "exclusively used for purposes incidental to those of the principal <br /> use . " Id. , § 10 . 02, subd. 72 . In this case, the principal use, <br /> the house, was Tillotson' s . The accessory use, the dock, was <br /> respondents ' . The use of the dock by respondents would not have <br /> been incidental to Tillotson' s use of his house and the dock would <br /> not have been exclusively used for purposes incidental to the ' <br /> house . Read together, these provisions did not permit respondents ' <br /> shared dock proposal . , <br /> ' ' Next, we consider whether respondents were entitled to �a <br /> -7- <br />