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Vy� � vl vl�vt�v a VIL'TI �VJIV VV/ (� �/ JV IV.J! �' .VV/ IV IVV. � ]J <br /> Thus, building a boat dack without a primary structure on the <br /> property would not be permirted by the code . This construction. <br /> expl,aine the denial of xeepondenta ' first dock propoeal . At i�sue <br /> in this appeal ig respondente ' ehared dock propoBal . <br /> The code makes it "unlawful for any pereon to engage or <br /> participat� in bus�nee9 uee or joint use without firet having <br /> obtained a licenee therefor from the City. " Id„ � 5 . 42 , subd. 2 . <br /> 'The code defines "jaint u�e" as "more than two persons ioining for <br /> the puxpose of using lakeshore property for swimming, bathing, <br /> fiehing, dock.�ng or mooring boats, or for any ocher purpose . " Id , , <br /> subd. 1F. In this case, Tillotson and reepondents wished to use <br /> the same piece of property for docking boats . In addition, the <br /> code indicates that "private" docks are a permissible accessory <br /> u�e . The use of the dock by both Tillotson and respor.�ents did not <br /> aeemingly �ransform it into a business use, but the propoeal did <br /> not call for a purely private dock for the Tillotson home . The <br /> definition of "u�e-accessory" provides that ic ie a uee <br /> "exclusively used for purposes incidental to those of the principal <br /> uge, �� �, § 10 . 02 , eubd. 72 . In this case , the principal uae, <br /> the house, was Tillotsan' s . The accessory use , the dock, was <br /> respondents ' . The use of the dock by respondents would nat have <br /> been incidental to Tillotson' e uae of his house and the dock would <br /> not have been exclusively used for purpoees incidental to the <br /> house. Read together, these proviaions did not permit reepondente ' <br /> ehared dock proposal . <br /> � ' Next, we consider wheth�r reepondent9 were entitled to 'a <br /> . _�_ . <br />