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04-14-1986 Council Packet
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04-14-1986 Council Packet
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II. The F ect of Abstention on the Computation of ttie <br />Voting Aajority <br />The common law rule regarding the effect of an abstention <br />is that whenever municipal officials are present and do not vote at <br />all, they virtually acquiesce in the election made by those who do <br />vote. The common law rule evolved because the courts were <br />confronted with situations in which it appeared that one or more <br />members of a municipal council had sought, by abstention from <br />voting, to block or to impede the adoption of some measure even <br />though, had they actually voted against the action, they could not <br />have achieved such an objective. 63 American Law Reports 1077. The <br />issue often arose in situations where one or two members objected to <br />the appointment of some city official. By abstaining, and thereby <br />preventing a quorum, the non -voting members could control the <br />appointment even though a no vote would have been insufficient. <br />In response to this problem, the !.-.;urts adopted the common <br />law rule that an abstention is to be construed as agreement wi'.:i the <br />motion before the body. The result is to prohibit a council member <br />from accomplishing by inaction a result or a purpose which he or she <br />could not achieve by proper participation, in necessary decision <br />making. <br />Several cc. is have modified the common law rule to allow <br />an abstention to be counted as a negative vote when the non -voting <br />member has in fact voiced oppoEition to the motion prior to the <br />vote. This modification, however, is not the prevailing rule. <br />Similarly, the courts have recognized that an abstention <br />from voting may be due to a ►a mber's personal pecuniary interest in <br />the matter at hand. An a �ssion of a member's conflict of <br />:.iterest prior to a vote ied some court's to rule that the <br />abstention cannot be count as an affirmative vote. See L. �iesey v< <br />Secancus, 87 A 950 (Ni Sup. i91 Quinn v. Sea Isle City, 1 A 1118 <br />(NJ 1909). This interpretation _..snot be relied upon in all <br />instances. For example, in 1973 the North Dakota Supreme Court held <br />that the abstentions of two Northwestern Bell employees, who refused <br />to vote on a tax matter affect.ng their company were t) be counted <br />as votes with the majority. Northwestern Bell Telephone Company v. <br />Board of Commerce, 211 N.W.2d 39—(N.D. 1973). <br />Given the fact that the Courts are not in total agreement <br />on the effect of an abstention, it would b� prudent to def:?r the <br />taking of a vote when a council member must abstain due to a <br />`list of interest. Such deferment would leave the Council in a <br />u ter oos.ition should tha vote ever be contested. <br />KAD/jk <br />4497e <br />
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