08-13-1990 Council Packet - Laserfiche WebLink

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(D MllUlO SJPP^;>Av£f^juoo*'Tb KJtt V i: 26 Minn. 246 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES [1, 2] While in general subdivision regu lations are a valid exercise of the police power, made necessary by the problems subdivisions create—i. e., greater needs for munieipa! services and facilities—, the pos sibility of arbitrariness and unfairness in their application is nonetheless subsUntiai: municipality could use dedication regula tions to exact land or fees from a subdivid er far out of proportion to the needs creat ed by his subdivision in order to avoid im posing the burden of panng for additional services on all citizens via taxation. To tolerate this situation would be to allow an otherwise acceptable exe.-cise of police pow er to become grand theft But the enabling statute he.-e prevents this from occurring by authorizing dedication of only a "reason able portion" of land for the purposes stat ed. We therefo.»‘e uphold the statute as constitutional. A "reasonable portion" is Construed to mean that portion of land which the evidence reasonably establishes the municipality will need to acquire for the purposes stated as a result of approval of the subdivision. This is. of necessity, a facts-and-circumsunces test, but it is the only kind of test that will consider the myriad of factors which may bear on a municipality’s needs for certain kinds of facilities and the relationship of a particular subdivision to those needs. In articulating this test, we decline to follow the extreme approaches of the Illi nois and Montana cases discussed herein. We choose instead to follow the lead of Wisconsin, California, and New York, and those cases which hold that a reasonable relationship between the approval of the subdivision and the municipality's need for land is required. [3] 2. The issue of delegation of au thority to municipalities and their officials to regulate subdivisions is raised by the parties. The subdivision-control statute in this case imports a standard of reasonable ness and otherwise clearly specifies the type property boundaries with which (he legal sys tem is accustomed to dealing. Frequently, use of any given parcel of property is at the same time effectively a use of, or a demand upon. AJCt 7 4 of regulation authorized and the standards \ to which such a regulation must conform. This is all that .Minnesota case law requires. O'Brien v. City of Sc. Paul, 2S5 Minn. 378, 173 N.W.2d 462 (1969); Ue v. Delmont, 223 Minn. 101, 36 N.W.2d 530 (1949); State ex re!. Interstate Air-Parts. Inc. v. Af. A. C, 223 Minn. 175. 25 N.W.2d 718 (1947). 3. Th.-ee aspects of the Bloomington or dinance present further problems: (1) The requirement that 10 percent of the undevel oped land must be dedicated or its cash equivalent paid: (2) the definition of unde veloped land value as the estimate of mar ket value made by the city assessor: and (3) the use of the date of approval of the final plat as the date upon which undeveloped land value is determined. Since none of these aspects of the ordinance is mandated by the enabling statute, we might choose to hold that any or ail of them is beyond the authority given by that statute. For the reasons that follow, however, we find such a holding unnecessary. Requirements based on portions of the plat and ratios of the plat to acres have been upheld in the cases discussed supra. Billings Propenies, Inc. v. Y’eUowstone County, supra (V» to Vi? of the plat); Associ ated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay. Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, supra (2‘A acres of park or recreation land for each 1,000 new re.sidenis); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale. supra ($250 per lot); Jordan v. Village of .'^fenomonee Falls, su pra ($200 per lot). One case has held that a 7-percent requirement was arbitrary as a matter of law, using the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test. Ansuini v. City of Cranston. 107 R.I. 63. 264 A.2d 910 (1970). Two commentators have made the follow ing statement regarding flat percentage of land requirements in school dedication cases: .K requirement such as land dedication for schools, however, poses a property beyond the border of ihe user." Tak ings. Private Property and Public Rights. 81 Yale L.J. H9. 152.