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r <br />VhitmAfi r. <br />Court rile No. CT 93-12901 <br />those documents is misguided. There is nothing in cither document <br />which purports to limit Plaintiffs* right to subdivide Tract A. <br />As to whether stibdivided lots within Tract A may make use of <br />the easement appurtenc t to that tract, the law in that regard is <br />clear: <br />a right of way which is appurtenant to an estate is <br />appurtenant to every part of it, no matter into how many <br />parts it may be subdivided, and it inures to the benefit <br />of the owners of all subdivisions so situated that it can <br />be used. <br />Sorkil V. Strom. 156 Minn. 155, 158, 194 N.W. 333, 334 (1923)* <br />Defendants nevertheless contend that the use of the term **a <br />residence" in the cost-sharing provision of the 1976 warranty deed <br />purports to limit the use of the easement to one residence on each <br />of Tracts A, C, and D. Although there appears to be some ambiguity <br />in the 1976 deed as to whether the easement is intended to serve <br />more than one residence on a particular tract, the 1978 easement <br />agreement, which modified the easement's cost and tax sharing <br />arrangement, provided: <br />that the cost of the maintenance and repair of and taxes <br />upon said Tract E shall be borne by the owners of Tracts <br />A, C, and D . . . dependent upon use proportionate to <br />linear usages of Tract E computed after a residence has <br />been constructed on a particular tract or lot. Further, <br />the owner of each tract or lot shall be responsible for <br />repair of any damage caused to the road by him or his <br />agent or contractor. <br />(John Whitman Aff., Ex. E)(emphasis supplied). <br />The inclusion of the term "lot," in addition to the reference <br />to the then existing tracts, clearly indicates that use of the