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Minn. 713NTSBAUM V. BLUE EARTH COUNTYCIUMia N.Wja 71) (Minn. IMS)ligence in placement of speed signs. The District Court. Blue Earth County. Miles Zimmerman, J., granted state's motion for summary judgment based on discretionary immunity doctrine. Motonst appealed. [6] It is possible that plaintiff could have shown that, in addition to the Barr report, the city had approved a mimber of building permits in the immediate vicinity of the Chabot home which added additional ---------- -rr------ runoff of water into the holding pond. He! The Court of Appeals. 411 N.W.2d 917, ' reversed and remanded for trial on issue ofcould perhaps have shown by expert testi mony that these permits increased the risk of da.Tiage to the plaintiffs home. How ever, other than vague and general refer ences to growth in the watershed area, this evidence, even if available, was not presented. A city can be liable for trespass or nui- sance caused by such an increased flow of water or by a change in the flow of water which affected its normal and natural flow. See Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Minn.1984). However, that issue was dismissed by the trial court and was not appealed. Plaintiff elected to proceed at trial and on appeal on the negligence theo ry alone and has wholly failed, as a matter of law, in our opinion, to prove the essen tial elements of his case.' Therefore, under the unique facts of this case and the theory of law on which this case was tried, we must reverse the court of appeals and the trial court. We remand to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for appellant city. whether state had created a danger. State sought further appeal. The Supreme Court, Yetka, J.. held that (1) not all acta involving exercise of judgment by agents of the government are protected as discre tionary functions, and critical inquiry is whether challenged governmental conduct involved balancing of policy objectives: (2) motorist’s challenge to state ’s placement of sign marking end of speed zone requested by county, some 1,000 feet from sharp curve, was not barred by discretionary function exception; and (3) state ’s duty to exercise reasonable care in determining whether to authorize a speed zone includes exercise of reasonable care in determining where to place signs marking the end of the speed zone. Decision of CJourt of Appeals affirmed and case remanded. Ralph S. NUSBAUM. Respondent, V. COUNTY 0/ BLUE EARTH and Sute of Minnesota. Petitioners. Appellants. No. C3-87-338. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 22, 1988. 1. Municipal Corporations «=*744 Discretion in the context of a govern ment employee's common-law immunity from tort liability was much broader than the type of discretion referred to in the discretionary fr.nction exception applicable in actions against governmental units un der Tort Claims Act M.S.A. § 3.736, subd. 3(b). Motorist injured in one-car accident on count/ road sued county and state for neg- 2. Municipal Corporations ^744 Not all acts involving exercise of judg ment by agents of the government are protected from tort liability as discretion ary functions: the protection afforded by discretionary function exception does not extend to professional or scientific judg ment where such judgment does not in- 1. Having determined that mere insdequs^ of a holding pond if not grounds for a ncgligcn^ suit, w« need not reach the fourth isAie regird- ing the lack of expert testimony on the »poropri- ate sundard of adequacy. J