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October 3,1997 s mu« answer the preliminary quesUon of whether First Amendment pro- tectiom are at all Implicated in this case. The trial coun believed they were because [p]art of (Fantasy House's] Inventory consists of materials siK* as ^ult wdeos, greeUng cards with sexually explicit messages, and T-shiits , Crystal argues that Fantasy House is not entitled to First Amendment protections because its operations have only an incidental relationship to speech-related activities.’ S!!?' appioximately 2% of Fantasy House s malerials are o« ihe Amendment protection. Fantasy House fwtes that Crystal cites ^ ^ assertion. We shart not enter the thicket pre sently by the question of whether Rrst AMendment protections apply only when a wirtahj^^rcerit of materials sold by an estabGshmeni are of the type qualifying for that Wc recognize that without First Amendinent protection, Fantasy House would face an insurmountable task in challenging these municipal ordi nances. See Wedemeyer v. City of Minneapolis, 540 N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. App. 1995) (municipal ordinances are valid, absent proof that they are clearly discriminatory and lack any relation to public health, safety, or general welfare); Chase v. City of Minneapolis, 401 N \V.2d 408, 412 (Minn. App. 1987) (standard of review for zoning decisions is whether action was re^onable and not arbitrary and capricious). Therefore, b^ause wc deem it important to reach the substantive issues presented by this case, and because consideration of the substantive issues results in a inclusion that the ordinances are constitutional even when tested under Rrsi Amendm^t principles, we shall assume, without so holding, that Fantasy House is indeed entitled to First Amendment protection. Constitutionality of the Interim Ordinance Crystal concedes that the interim ordinance provided no place in Ciystal for w adult business to locate, but argues that Minn. Siai. § 462 355, subd. 4 (1996), gives it broad powers to create such an ordinance. Wc agree. Minn. Stat. § 462.355, subd. 4, reads in relevant part: If a municipality is conducting studies or has authorized a study to be conducted or has held or has scheduled a hearing for the pur pose of considering adoption • • • of (an ordinance] • • • the governing body of the municipality may adopt an interim ordi nance applicable to all or part of its jurisdiction for the purpose of protecting the planning process and the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. The interim ordinance may regulate, restrict or pro hibit any use • • • within the jurisdiction • • • for a period not to exceed one year from the date it is effective • • TTic record indicates that Crystal complied with these requireme' ts. The interim ordinance mandated that city officials study the "effect of faduli] uses on other uses in the surrounding area" and present the results to the Planning Commission and City Council. ^ A moratorium may be enacted for a limited duration if appropriate stud- IM arc conducted and zoning ordinances arc expeditiously adopted. N.W.2d at 542. Here, a permanent ordinance was idopced^proximately seven months after enactment of the interim ordi nance. This was expeditious as a matter of law. We are aware, also, that a city may not enact an interim ordinance in an iroltrary manner to limit a certain project. Medical Services, Inc. v. City of Savage, 487 N.W.2d 263,267 (Minn. App. 1992). There is no possibil ity that the interirn ordinance at issue here was enacted to limit a certain project interim ordinance was enacted at least three months before Crystal mame aware that Fantasy House was planning to open for busi ness in Crystal. Fantasy House claims that Wedemeyer and Medical Services arc an yparent contradiction to other holdings of this court. DI MA Corp. v. City of St Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312, 321-22 (Minn. App. 1997) ("A city cannot ban adult uses totally or fail to provide reasonable sites for rcloca- S?? a A Alexrnder v. City of Minneapolis, 928 F 2d 278. 283-84 (&h Cir. 1991)), review denied (Minn. July 28, 1997). The dis tinction, however, is simple: while a cit> can rarely ban a panicular use with a permanent zoning ordinance, Minnesota law created n '•rim zon- log ordinances for just such a moratorium. See Minn. Slut. § 462 355. subd. 4. Constitutionality of the Permanent Ordinance We turn now to United States Supreme Court case law that describes the standards an ordinance must meet to comply with the con^iiiutinnal r^uirements for restricting adult establishmeot.s. Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations arc constitutional if **ury arc designed u> CwrtcfAppesli 'i Finance and C ommerce A ppellate C our ts Editic ______.s-a____■ ! ---------------------------------------- •serve a substantial government interest and do not unreasonably limi,’ alternative avenues of communication. Clly of Renton v. PlavuZ nieatres. inc. 475 U.S. 41.47.106 S. CL 921928 (1986). Whc,h« "e permanent ordinance is a valid content-neutral, time, place, and manner regulation was not addressed by the trial court and was not raised as an issue in this a; peal. Therefore, wc focus our analysis on whether ihc per manent ordin^ce docs serve a substantial government interest and docs not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. A. Narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. Courts have consistently held that preventing the negative secondary effects associated with adult establishments is a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Sec City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-5 1,106 S. Cl. at 930-3 1; ILQ Investment, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, U16(8ihCir. 1994). For Crystal to prove that its permanent ordinance is narrowly tailored to the government interest, it must prove that adult establishments cause negative secondary effects. In doing so. (tjhc First Amendment docs not require a city • • • to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already gen erated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 51 -52, 106 S. Cl. at 931 (emphasis added). In this case. Crystal relied on studies of businesses that allow on-site consumption of sexually explicit material to prove that all adult establish ments cause negative secondary effects. 1 Examples of adult establishments that provide on-site consumption of sexually explicit material include massage parlors, nude dance dubs, adutt movie theaters, and adult establishments that provide booths for privately viewing adult movies Fantasy House provides no on-site consumption of sexually explidt material. The trial court agreed with Fantasy House’s position that the difference between businesses that provide on-site consumption of sc.xually e.xplicii material and those that do not is so significant that the studies of busi nesses providing on- site consumption could not reasonably be relied upon to restrict businesses that do not provide on-siic consumption. Because it rejected the city s reliance on these studies, the trial court held that the permanent ordinance* The trial court’s holding actually encompassed both the irterim arxl permarwnt erdi- nafKes. In view ol our earlier analysis of the constitutionality of the Interim ordinance, we limit our consideration of the trial courTs determination on this issue to the perma- nent ordinance only. ^ was not narrowly tailored to a substantial government interest and was unconstitutional. While we do not dispute that distinctions may. indeed, be drawn between on-site and off-site consumption in regulating adult establish ments, we conclude that case law does not support the"trial court s con clusion. The distinction between businesses that provide on-site con sumption and those that do not has been considered by this court and rejected as "simply not the law.- City of Ramsey v. Holmbere, 548 N.W.2d 302, 306 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Aue. 6, 1996). A city need only prove that the ordinance targets businesses "rea sonably believed to produce at least some of the unwanted secondary effects • • Id. (quoting ILQ Investments. 25 F.3d at 1418).* fX)t€ the strong dissent In City of Aamtty and other case law that would charac- terlze thiu distinction at fundamental. See, e.g., 2J. Qltu v. City of Aurora. 932 F.Supp. 1256,1258 (0. Colo. 1996) (calling analysis In ILQ flawed for considering the subjective Intent of the city instead of the objective effects on the freedom to ce nmu- nlcate). Further. In its amicus brief. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (MCLU) cites 44 Llquormart v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Cl. 1495 (1996) to argue lhat the ordinances upheld in ILQ and City of Ramsey would no longer be upheld 44 Liquormart holds that a state legislature does not have broad discretion to suppress truthful nonnus- leading advertising to further a state goat wvhen non speech-reiated alternatives are available. 116 S. Cl. at 1511. A concurrence states lhat courts must carefully exam ine statutes lhat restnci speech aDegedly to further a state goat. 116 S Ct at 1522 O’Connor. J.. concurnng. However. ILQ and Clly of Ramzey did not base their upholding of ordinances on any perceived di^relion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading speech. Instead, these courts based their holdings on the conclusion that the distinction between businesses that provide on-$rte consumption and businesses that do not is irrelevant. Such inde pendent judicial determinations demonstrate that ILQ and City of Ramsey gave iheir re spective ordinances sufficiently stncl scrutiny Wc believe that the test established by the Supreme Court in City of Rentun requires us to answer the following question: Did Crystal rcu-