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Justice Stevens did not expressly describe the standard he had used, but it was <br />clear that the plurality would afford non-obscene sexually explicit speech lesser First <br />Amendment protection than other categories of speech. However, four dissenters and <br />one concurring justice concluded that the degree of protection afforded speech by the <br />First Amendment does not vary with the sodal value ascribed to that speech. In his <br />concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that the four-part test of United States v. <br />O’Brien. 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.CL 1673, 1679 (1968), should apply. Powell <br />explained: <br />Under that test, a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified, despite its <br />Incidental impact upon First Amendment interests, “If it is within the <br />constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or <br />substantial govefiimental interest; if the governmental interest is urvelated to <br />the suppression of free expression; and if the inddental restriction on ... <br />First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of <br />that interest* <br />427 U.S. at 79-80,96 S.Ct at 2457 (citation omitted), (Powell, J., concurring). <br />. -t <br />;roc <br />•jrB.• •• . <br />m <br />- <br />Perhaps because Justice Stevens' plurality opinion did not offer a dearly <br />articulated standard of review, post-Young courts often applied the O'Brien test <br />advocated by Justice Powell In his concurring opinion. Many ordinances regulating <br />sexually oriented businesses were invalidated under the 0'Biien test See R.M. Stein, ^ <br />Regulation of Adult Businesses Through Zoning After Renton. 18 Pac. LJ. 351, 360 <br />(1987) ("consistently invalidated*); SA Bender, Regulating Pornography Through. <br />Zoning: Can We'Oean Uo'Honolulu? 8 U. Haw. L Rev. 75,105 (1986) (ordinances . <br />upheld In only about half the cases). <br />Applying Young, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a zoning ordinance <br />adopted by the city of Minneapolis. Alexander v. City of Minneapolis , 698 F.2d 936 (8th <br />Clr. 1983). In Alexander, the challenged ordinance had three major restrictions on <br />sexually oriented businesses: distancing from specified uses, prevention of <br />concentration and amortization. It prohibited a sexually oriented business from <br />operating within 500 feet of districts zoned for residential or office-residences, a church. <br />-32-