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04 14 0«> FRI 12:29 FAX <br />m VI6CM7HOIO <br />0017 ’ <br />04/13/00 1l:b0 C3I :19/21 N0:240 <br />Thua, building a boat dock without a primary atructure on the <br />proplirty Would not be permlttad by tha cede. This construction <br />explains tha denial o£ respondents* first dock proposal. At issue <br />in this appeal is respondents' shared dock proposal. <br />The eede makes it "unlawful for any person to engage or <br />participate in bueiness uae or joint use without first having <br />obtained a license therefor from the City." ItL> S S.42, subd. 2. <br />0 M •• <br />The code defines "joint use" as "more than two persons joining for <br />the purpose of using lakeshore property for swimming, bathing, <br />fishing, docking or mooring boats, or for any other purpose." <br />eubd. IF. In this case, Tillotson and respondents wished to use <br />the same piece of property for docking boats. Xn addition, the <br />code indicates that "private" docks are a permissible accessory <br />use. The use of the dock by both Tilleeson and respondents did not <br />seemingly transform it into a business uae. but the proposal did <br />net call for a purely private dock for the Tillotson home. The <br />' • •• <br />definition Of "use-aeeeasory* p^!;videa that it is a use <br />Hexclusively used for purposes incidental to those of the principal <br />use." Id.. S 10.02. eubd. 72. in this case, the principal use, <br />the house, was Tillotson's. The accessory use, the dock, was <br />respondents *. The use of the dock by respondents would not have <br />been incidental to Tillotson's use of his house and the dock would <br />not have been exclusively uaed for purposes incidental to the <br />house. Read together, these previsions did not permit respondents' <br />shared dock proposal. <br />Next, we eoneider whether respondents were entitled to a <br />-7- <br />A