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aunty <br />tjttdice. <br />'wn his <br />•city in <br />County, <br />uid hit <br />Jy used <br />d repair <br />Kl. the <br />e which <br />at In <br />upersed- <br />■fee bom <br />red to be <br />linances <br />, repair, <br />lent was <br />defend* <br />With two <br />mtaininf <br />4 of the <br />table for <br />brother <br />is alto a <br />property. <br />t began <br />storage <br />aipaat, <br />be open, <br />cial in* <br />tion was <br />tg ordi* <br />snt peti* <br />of Com* <br />ig Advi- <br />; of bit <br />-1, light <br />Mvitory <br />)f reaon* <br />county <br />pted the <br />petition. <br />owledge <br />itruction <br />naterialt <br />buildiog <br />FlITT or FREEBOBN ?. 0LAU88EK <br />CMettmK.waan <br />Minn. 325 <br />(1] 1. The county argues that defend­ <br />ant should have taken a direct appeal to <br />the district court from the action of the <br />county board denying hit petition to rexone <br />and that, in the absence of such appeal, he <br />is precluded from raising the defense that <br />the county toning ordinance, as applied to <br />him, is unconstitutional. We disagree with <br />this contention and adopt the reasoning of <br />County of Lake v. MacNeal, 24 III.2d 253, <br />181 K.E.2d 85 (1962). That case involved <br />somewhat similar facts, and the same con­ <br />tention was made that the defendant <br />should have pursued his claim of nnconsti- <br />tutionality through an appeal from the leg­ <br />islative determination rather than as a de­ <br />fense in a separate action commenced by <br />the county. The Illinois court suted (24 <br />lll2d 260, 181 N.E2d 90): <br />M •^ So loni: as dOcal authoriiies <br />institute an action, a defendant should be <br />entitled to defend on the p’ound of the <br />invalidity of the ordinance and to have <br />the issue determined If it arere to be <br />otherwise, the result could be that judi­ <br />cial machinery would be used to enforce <br />an ordinance that is unconstitutional'* <br />We do net condone the action of defendant <br />in continuing the construction of the build­ <br />ing after the denial of his rexomrsg peti­ <br />tion, but we conclude that he should not be <br />dep.*ived of the right to raise constitutional <br />issues in defending this action. <br />2. An important question, and one of <br />first impression in Minnesota, it whether <br />the construction of the building was an ex ­ <br />pansion or extension of the nonconforming <br />use. <br />The Freeborn County Zoning Ordinance, <br />I 423, provides: <br />*The nonconforming use of land <br />wher^ a structure thereon is not so em­ <br />ployed, existing at the time Jiat this Or­ <br />dinance becomes effective, may be con­ <br />tinued provided: 1. The nonconforming <br />use of land shall not ta any way be ex­ <br />panded or extended either on the same <br />or adjoining property. 2. That if the <br />nonconforming use of land, existing at <br />the time this Ordinance became effec­ <br />tive, is thereafter discontinued or <br />changed, then the future use of such <br />land shall be in conformity with the pro­ <br />visions of this Ordinance.” (Italics sup­ <br />plied.) <br />[2] A residential toning ordinance may <br />constitutionally prohibit the creation of <br />uses which are nonconforming, but exist­ <br />ing nonconforming uses must either be <br />permitted to remain or be eliminated by <br />use of eminent domain. Hawkins v. Tal ­ <br />bot, 248 Minn. 549, 80 N.W2d 863 (1957). <br />It is not reouired. however, that preexist? <br />ing nonconforming uses be allowed to ex ­ <br />pand or enlarge. '1 ne public policy behind <br />that clocthne is to increase ^e <br />3Ianu3^se^wniinnme be eliminated <br />^uMoobsoiScSicerTxhaustion or oestruc- <br />tion. This in turn will lead tO-a^nni(gng^ <br />use of the land consistent with the overall <br />^^omprehra <br />We have found no Minnesou cases di­ <br />rectly in point, but there are cases from <br />other jurisdictions that are helpful In <br />Shannahan v. Ringgold, 212 Md. 481, 129 <br />A2d 797 (1957), the landowners had erect­ <br />ed a large warehouse, proposing to use the <br />ground floor for storage of equipment, ve­ <br />hicles, and mschinery —the .-ame uses to <br />which the open land had been put prior to <br />the erection of the building. The business <br />was in a residentially toned area but was a <br />valid nonconforming use. The toning or­ <br />dinance was no more restrictive than the <br />one involved here. The Maryland Court <br />of Appeals stated that they could find <br />nothing in the ordinance that would permit <br />the use of the new building merely because <br />a similar use had been esUblished on open <br />land and held that the construction of a <br />new building was an unlawful extension of <br />a nonconforming use. <br />Weber v. Pieretti, 72 N.J.Super. 184, 178 <br />A2d 92 (1962), involved an addition to an <br />existing building. The contention was that <br />the addition was designed to park trucks <br />and to carry on the same activities which <br />d W if <br />t <br />J